The rapid economic growth in China after the implementation of its "Open-Door Policy" in 1978 has been witnessed by the rest of the world. This economic boom has been accompanied by the decrease of stateowned businesses and the dramatic growth of private businesses. It was reported in 2006 that the private sector accounted for about half of China's GDP (China Statistical Yearbook, 2007) . After 30 years of sustained market-oriented deregulation and decentralization policies, domestic entrepreneurship and private business have been identified as "one of the most important driving forces behind China's rapid economic development" (Yang and Li, 2007) . According to the 2007 report of Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the Chinese government has become very supportive for new incubators and new science parks. Although some improvements are still needed, the entrepreneurial environment has become more and more friendly and accommodating. About 70% of the Chinese who were surveyed think entrepreneurship is a good career choice (GEM, 2007) . It should be noted that, as a transition economy, China has spent a fair amount of time in making changes and allowing entrepreneurship to take root.
The Chinese evolutionary approach of economic transition is different from the "Big Bang" approach undertaken by Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. China's transition from being a command-and-control economy to an economy that allows marketization and privatization has been a gradual, incremental, and experimental process. The legitimacy of private enterprises was not accepted at the beginning of the introduction of reform and openness policy. As a result, the implementation of China's reform policy created an environment where the emergence of market mechanism was accompanied by price controls and central planning, and a dominant role was played by the state and collective sector, especially in the early years of market reform. The pragmatic and experimental approach of reforming has resulted in a less-than-smooth process and the gradual realization of marketization and privatization. The observation of China's entrepreneurship development in the background of phased institutional transition provides an excellent opportunity to examine how the evolution of China's entrepreneurship responds to socio-economic factors and institutional environments. Yang and Li (2007) point out that the temporal dimension of entrepreneurship development has been largely ignored in the literature. Entrepreneurship research for the mature market economies has focused on explaining how entrepreneurial opportunities are identified in the market and what the determinants of entrepreneurship are, not only from the macro socio-economic level but also from the individual level, while entrepreneurship research in the context of transitional economies has treated the interaction between entrepreneurship and institutional evolution as an important research topic (Chang and MacMillan, 1991) .
This chapter is meant to examine the history and development of entrepreneurship in China in the reform period and to clarify the stages of entrepreneurship evolution from the perspective of institutional transition. Based on the review of the history of entrepreneurship, the characteristics of China's entrepreneurship in terms of strategic choice, distribution, and dynamic change are identified.
This chapter is organized as follows, starting from the demonstration of the historical trend of entrepreneurship development using official statistics. Section 2.2 provides the basic temporal picture for private businesses. We then divide the historical development of China's entrepreneurship into four phases. The entrepreneurship trend related to the institutional environment is individually identified for each stage. Section 2.3 describes the unique characteristics of entrepreneurship in China and how they are shaped. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.
The Stage of Market Transitions: Opportunities and Challenges for Entrepreneurship
The discussion of the history on entrepreneurship takes us to the year 1949, when the new People's Republic of China was established. However, the period from 1949 to 1978 has a negligible position in the history of entrepreneurship development. The goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was to turn China into a socialist economy. Following the ideology of collective ownership and identity, the government asserted the legitimacy of central control over the national economy. Private ownership was regarded to be incompatible with a socialist regime. By 1956, the private sectors had been transformed into SOEs in different ways during the process of eliminating capitalism. However, private entrepreneurial activities that generated personal income were never completely eliminated from the practical life during the years of socialist construction period from 1956 to 1966 (Liao and Sohmen, 2001; Tsai, 2007) . During the disastrous years of Cultural Revolution (1966 Revolution ( -1976 , all private businesses were attached to a stigma of "the capitalist tails". The private sector was extremely suppressed due to the political turmoil for the rest of the Mao era.
Modern entrepreneurship in China was not unleashed until the beginning of the reform era. Table 2 .1 presents data showing the growth of registered private businesses, including individual businesses with less than eight employees and private enterprises with more than eight employees in terms of the numbers of private businesses. Table 2 .2 presents the growth of employees in the private sector. As indicated in Table 2 .1, starting from 1979, there was a dramatic growth in individual household businesses because of the originally small base. The existing political turmoil contributed to the economic downturn of private businesses in 1989-1992. Renewed and speedy growth occurred after Deng Xiaoping's widely acclaimed speech in 1992, which centered on creating a more progressive future for China.
From 1978 to 1992
2.2.1.
The emergence and rise of TVEs
The Third Plenary Session of the CCP's 11th Central Committee in 1978 marked the inception of China's reform and "opening up policy". The first step of the reform policy was the decentralization of agriculture. The command-style commune system was replaced by the household contract responsibility system, and the peasants were granted the rights to use the land and profit from it. Thus, peasants were allowed to decide what to grow and furthermore, the stipulations from this crucial new policy direction on agriculture provided for individual household business (getihu) to operate. The implementation of the responsibility system in rural areas had facilitated a dramatic increase in China's agricultural output, which has been confirmed by many official reports. The success in the reform initiated in the rural areas also promoted the extension of reform policies to the urban areas. (Chen, 2006) . The success and prosperity of TVEs contributed significantly to the country's economic growth in the 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, TVEs accounted for about 20% of China's gross output (Liao and Sohmen, 2001 ). The annual output from TVEs grew by 28% between 1979 and 1987 (Chang and MacMillan, 1991 . In the meantime, TVEs have also contributed to the national economy by creating competition with the SOEs. It can be concluded that the first generation of Chinese modern entrepreneurs emerged from the development of TVEs.
TVEs are defined as "all those rural non-state enterprise subordinate to the townships or village governments and owned and operated collectively" (Luo, Tan, and Shenkar, 1998: p. 33) . Although always located in rural areas or of rural origins, TVEs can take several different forms. "From the ownership point of view, they are set up by townships, villages, several households (or partnerships), individual household (or private), or jointly by Chinese and foreign partners through shareholding mechanisms or shareholding cooperative systems" (Liang, 2006: p 235) . TVEs are usually referred to as collective enterprises and thus enjoy much clearer and articulated support from the state than private-owned enterprises since it belonged to the range of non-private ideology (Che and Qian, 1998) . For example, until 1981, there was a restriction for private enterprises of less than eight employees but not for TVEs at that time (Che and Qian, 1998) . However, as a matter of fact, most of the TVEs were privately owned were marked as public entitles (Liang, 2006; Peng and Heath, 1996) .
Although the managers of TVEs were different from authentic entrepreneurs because most of them were contractors and did not own these enterprises, many entrepreneurial characteristics were demonstrated in the development of TVEs. First, TVEs established an alliance with the local government in the form of collective enterprises to seek institutional legitimacy at the beginning stage of economic reform characterized by weak market structures (Luo, Tan, and Shenkar, 1998) . The entrepreneurial spirit of local government officials in public sectors was reflected in the process of contracting out government responsibility role and was even referred to as "local government entrepreneurship" (Hubbard, 1995) . Second, although local governments provided TVEs with part of the capital, markets, and land, the TVE entrepreneurs had to adapt to the market prices and costs in the pursuit of profits. On the other hand, the TVE entrepreneurs took the initiative to form an alliance with local government officials and their agents. Krug and Mehta (2004) identified this kind of ability to "form an alliance with those economic agents who possess or control the financial assets, physical assets, or specific human capital need for brokering market entry…" as the key factor in successful entrepreneurship in China. From these two viewpoints, TVEs can be regarded as the beginning of contemporary Chinese entrepreneurship. TVE entrepreneurship was the dominant form of Chinese entrepreneurship throughout the 1980s (Li and Matlay, 2006) . The success of TVEs in promoting rural economic growth accelerated the transition from a centrally planned economic system to a more market-oriented economy and the concept of entrepreneurship then diffused into urban areas.
The emergence of private enterprise
The counterpart of the TVE entrepreneurs in urban areas is a second group of Chinese entrepreneurs who are self-employed individual businessowners. During the late 1970s, the movement of "up to mountains and down to villages" 1 in the Cultural Revolution came to an end, and hundreds of thousands of young people went back to urban areas. The huge young population could not find jobs immediately after return and expanded the number of "unoccupied idle labor" in urban areas. It was estimated that there were about 15 million unemployed people in cities 20 Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in China and towns (Yang, 2007) . The party leaders perceived this high unemployment rate as a serious social problem threatening the nation's stability and solidarity. Thus, a series of government policies, which were in fact beneficial to the previously firmly constrained private businesses, were brought about to cope with the unemployment crisis. In dealing with this crisis, the central government encouraged unemployed people to undertake individual businesses in "repair, service, and handicraft industries", as illustrated by the policy of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (Wu, 2005: p. 181 ). However, the release of constraints on private business was not completed in one step. At first, private businesses were limited to some specific businesses, and opening a new business required the approval of relevant government departments. In addition, hiring labor was not allowed except family members when the policy was first released. After the hot debate on "employment and exploitation" during the early 1980s (Yang, 2007) , the business owners were allowed to employ seven or less employees to ensure that they were not accused of capitalist exploitation. However, the development of originally smallscale individual businesses would never remain truly individual or household. Given the situation of the economic shortage right after the Cultural Revolution, the individual businesses experienced rapid growth under the government's cautious supporting policies. The gradual expansion of household businesses from individual to privately owned enterprises served as a warning to the political leaders to maintain a balance between developing the economy and maintaining political correctness, since at that time, private businesses were not regarded as ideologically consistent with the principles of socialist nations. It was the luck of the newly booming private entrepreneurs that a tacit consent stance was adopted, as represented by Deng Xiaoping's "wait and see" approach was taken to deal with the issues regarding the nature of private businesses. In 1983, a "Three-No" policy of no promotion, no public propaganda and no crackdown was proposed to regulate the development of private enterprises (Chen, 2007: p. 6 ).
The tacit and ambiguous attitude toward privates business was replaced by a clearer and friendlier posture in 1987. In the 13th Party Congress, the CCP admitted that private enterprises played an important role in developing the national economy and improving people's quality of life. In 1988, as the "supplementary component of China's socialist economy", the legitimate status of private enterprises was formally established in a constitutional amendment. A more specific regulation, The Interim Stipulations on Private Enterprises, was released by the State Council and gave a clear definition for "private enterprises" (a for-profit organization that is owned by an individual and employs more than eight people) and provided the legal basis for private enterprises to operate. However, it was also stated that the private sector should be subject to state supervision, guidance, and control. The direct result from these encouraging policies was that, from 1988 to 1989, the number of private firms doubled (Schönleber, 2000) . However, the development of private businesses was shaken by the political turmoil of 1989. It was reported that the growth rate of private enterprises dropped suddenly in the period 1989-1990 by about 50% (Schönleber, 2000) . The negative perception of governments attitude toward private enterprises also came from periodic political movements, such as the campaign against spiritual pollution (1983) (1984) and the "anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign" of 1987. The security of private rights was not securely guaranteed for private entrepreneurs, although there was existing written legislation. Facing such an unstable institutional environment, private enterprises were worried about policy changes in the future and reacted by taking flexible strategy choices, which are discussed in the next section.
From 1992 to 2000
This period witnessed the rapid growth of non-public sectors and the decrease of the relative importance of SOEs. Output from SOEs declined dramatically, from 77% in 1978 to about 28% in 1999. In the meantime, there was a rapid increase in the contribution of privately owned enterprises from zero in 1978 to over 18% in 1999. (Anderson et al., 2003) .
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping, who was the general architect of Chinese reform, called for deepening the transition to a socialist market economy in the famous "South Tour". Deng's southern tour assumed significant meaning because it sought out to assauge people's doubts on whether to support the development of private-owned enterprises. In the following year after his speech, the growth rate of private enterprises recorded remarkable increases (Anderson et al., 2003) . It seems that the signals of political acceptance sent out by the speeches of party leaders were associated with the surge of individual entrepreneurship.
Although the market mechanism as an invisible hand in economic system was emphasized relative to the economic regulation approach of command and control, according to the report of the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Congress, the mainstay status of the public sector should still be maintained at the national level. This meant that private businesses still did not enjoy the same treatment as those in the public sector, although private sector was already a legitimate element of the national economy at that time. The 15th Party Congress Meeting recognized the legal status of private enterprises as one of parity with the public sector in 1997, and a 1999 constitutional amendment acknowledged that non-public enterprises are an important part of a socialist market economy.
After introducing the concept of a socialist market economy, the government carried out a series of reform policies that came to effect and provided the necessary foundations for the development of both SOEs and private firms such as fiscal and tax reform, company law, and foreign exchange reform (Anderson et al., 2003) 
From 2000 to Present
The year 2000 was the beginning of the third stage of China's entrepreneurship development. Increasingly supportive and encouraging policies have been issued to channel private investment. In 2002, Zeng Peiyan, Minister of the State Development Planning Commission, asserted in a public speech that the government will "eliminate all restrictive and discriminatory regulations that are not friendly towards private investment and private economic development in taxes, land use, business start-ups, and imports and exports". This statement meant that the government was ready to treat public and private business equally.
Chen (2007) pointed out that the small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) promotion law promulgated in 2002 marked the start of a new era for the development of SMEs. Most of the SMEs in China are non-public entrepreneurial activities. Furthermore, China's accession to WTO in November 2001 symbolized that entrepreneurship in China would be more influenced by global competition. Since the 1990s, more than 75% of the added value in industrial output came from SMEs, and the private sector was reported to account for over two-thirds of industrial output (Chen, 2007; Tsai, 2007) . On the whole, this period is characterized by a rapid growth of modern entrepreneurship in China. The role of entrepreneurship in promoting economic growth, expanding employment, and stimulating technology innovation had become less bounded by the constraints from institutional ambiguities.
Entrepreneurship was once interpreted as an occupation for idle people who could not find other jobs and for those with criminal records (Nair, 1996) . The social status of entrepreneurs has improved significantly in light of an altered policy orientation, exposure to the global market and Western values, and also the success stories of a large number of entrepreneurs. Private entrepreneurs were even invited to enter the Party to participate in the management of state affairs by the Party leader Jiang Zemin in a speech celebrating the Party's 79th anniversary (Chen, 2007) . The National People's Congress amended the constitution to protect "the lawful rights and interest of the private sector of the economy". This new legislation indicates that Chinese government policy characterized by volatile attitudes toward private business is changing. However, it would be expected that the actual implementation of private property protection will lag due to its systemic implications for China's political and judicial situation (Tsai, 2007) . While considerable progress and improvements continue in today's China, it is important to note that entrepreneurial activities remain subject to infant legislation and unpublished regulations.
Chinese Characteristics in Entrepreneurship

Disguised Entrepreneurship: Red Hat Strategy
The earlier review about the different stages of entrepreneurship development reveals that private businesses founded in the early stages of the market transition suffered from a more unstable and hostile environment than those established later. The legal status of private enterprises with more than eight employees was not admitted until 1988. Before 1988, the registered private business only included individual household businesses.
In reality, there were many private enterprises with more than eight employees running disguised as collective enterprises or public businesses. The literature on TVEs revealed that a considerable portion of the TVEs and urban collective-owned enterprises were in fact privately owned (He, 2000; Naughton, 1994) . In the early years of market transition, the private firms took the popular "red hat" strategy, whereby they registered themselves as public-owned organizations and concealed their intrinsic private ownership. A private firm can obtain a legitimate non-private ownership in a variety of ways such as by running a private business branch within a state or collective enterprises or cooperating with the public sector in operating a joint-venture and exchange benefits, e.g., by submitting a certain amount of profit to the local government in order to be recognized as public owned (Yang, 2007) . These approaches of realizing a "red hat" label were was a way to achieve legitimacy through different disguises but it was not legally prohibited. Thus, it can also be regarded as one form of entrepreneurial opportunity that comes from exploiting the changing institutional rules. As pointed out in Yang's discussion (2007) , in the case of China, entrepreneurial opportunities arise not only in the market but also from institutional transition. The strategy of wearing a "red hat" can be considered as a kind of entrepreneurial activity to fill in the gaps between market demands and opaque institutional rules.
The adaptive strategy of wearing a "red hat" can be explained by the tacit and discriminating rules for private businesses. Before the declaration of explicit policies toward individual entrepreneurs in 1988, there had been a long-established "wait and see" policy since the initiation of the reform policy. The pragmatic experimental approach of this Chinese market transition determined the business environment characterized by the coexistence of the public-owned and free private enterprise sectors for a relatively long period. The public sector has been coordinated by state central planning, with the features of controlled prices and no competition, while the private sectors were subject to the price mechanism (Krug and Mehta, 2004) . The chronological public policies regarding how to cultivate and maintain balance between the two sectors have created an uncertain institutional environment and poorly functioning markets for entrepreneurship development, especially in the first stage of market transition. The Chinese government held an ambivalent attitude toward the private sector. On one hand, it was necessary to keep private businesses as the vehicles to generate employment opportunities, eliminate poverty problems, and promote economic growth. On the other hand, the party leaders spared no effort to maintain the dominant position of the public sector in the national economy. Thus, even after the legitimate status of private enterprises with more than eight employees was acknowledged in 1988, a lot of implicitly and explicitly discriminating and inequitable rules and policies toward private businesses still existed. For example, private enterprises faced restrictions in entering into several sectors, which remained open only to state enterprises. The prohibited sectors include financial services, tobacco, telecommunications, automobiles production and rail and air civil transportation (Tsai, 2007: p. 56 ). The institutional ambiguity could also be shown in the determination of the administrative organization in charge of private business affairs. There has been no administrative body directly responsible for private enterprises while every government department has the right to supervise and guide private businesses (Yang, 2007) . Another discriminating rule came in the Chinese taxation system. In the 1980s, the private sector was subject to higher rates of taxation than state and collective enterprises and also many arbitrary charges from local government agencies (Yang, 2007) . Although the market transition reform has provided the foundation for exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities, the entrepreneurial activities have been intensively constrained by institutional discrimination. The ultimate reason for discrimination is based on the status of private ownership. The red hat strategy is a form of fuzzy property rights arrangement and has the advantage of disguising the true underlying private ownership while maintaining legitimate and more adaptive ownership.
The main advantage of "wearing a red hat" is that private entrepreneurs can worry less about the instability of state policy toward the private sector. The identity of public ownership obtained by "wearing a red hat" can ensure similar treatment as that of state and collective enterprises. For example, "red hat" entrepreneurs have easier access to bank loans, enjoy lower tax rates, and are no longer subject to arbitrary charges from local governments. The "red hat" strategy has become a common and standardized operating practice for private entrepreneurs in China (Tsai, 2007) . The popularity of the "red hat" strategy is also due to the alliance between private entrepreneurs and government officials. While entrepreneurs benefit from this adaptive strategy, government officials also have a vested interest in accepting the "red hat" strategy and promoting the expansion and development of private enterprises as a way to expand local revenues (Tsai, 2007) . Private entrepreneurs try actively to establish an alliance with government officials who have the actual power of designating labor, land, and capital to exploit the identified entrepreneurial opportunities in the market. The alliance between entrepreneurs and government officials has been identified as an important mechanism to explain the rapid growth of private enterprises (Peng and Luo, 2000) .
Entrepreneurship in China is dubbed as double entrepreneurship in the literature (Yang, 2007) . The "red hat" strategy popular among Chinese entrepreneurs is the non-market dimension of double entrepreneurship that enables the manipulation of institutional rules in an underdeveloped market economy. This is one of the distinct characteristics of entrepreneurship in China.
Regional Variation of China's Entrepreneurship
Apart from institutional transition at national level, the local characteristics of the political, social, and economic situation have also exerted their effects on entrepreneurship development. The regional difference in entrepreneurship can be indicated by regional variation in the magnitude of private businesses. In 2003, 69.3% of the registered private enterprises were located in coastal China, 17.1% were in central provinces, and 13.5% were in the west. In the case of total registered individual businesses, 48.3%, 31%, and 20.7% were concentrated in East, Central, and West China, respectively. 2 These statistics show that there is a notable regional disparity in terms of entrepreneurship distribution.
The concentration of entrepreneurial activities in East China can be explained by the existence of a coastal-biased reform policy. The special economic zones located in coastal provinces were first selected as the frontier of implementing opening-up policy. The preferential policies in terms of launching international trade and accommodating foreign investment were granted to these special economic zones. Afterward, these preferential policies were expanded to other coastal cities. The advantage of coastal areas in developing entrepreneurship also comes from their innate geographical endowments. Southern coastal China has geographical proximity and tight cultural and linguistic links with overseas Chinese communities, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, which were once primary sources of FDI in China. Chen (2007) argued that private firms in the coastal region are less likely to adopt the "red hat" strategy than their inland counterparts inland since polices in coastal provinces have been more market oriented.
Another source of regional variation in entrepreneurship derives from the fact that local interpretation and implementation of reform polices depends on the actual situation of local jurisdictions. It is widely admitted that the central policy may look very different by the time it reaches particular localities (Tsai, 2007) . There is a wide range of opportunities for private entrepreneurs and local officials to exploit and realize their entrepreneurial activities and in the meantime take action within the confines of the government regulations. Tsai (2007) proposed five regional development models related to the development of the private sector. These models are the Wenzhou model, the Sunan model, the Zhujiang model, the state-dominated model, and the pattern of limited development model. The variability of entrepreneurship development in terms of legitimacy and viability in these five typical regions is regarded as due to the "combination of differential national policies and local responses to those polices" (Tsai, 2007: p. 153 ).
Changing Entrepreneurship: From Network-Based to Innovation-Based
Peng (2003) argues that there is a decline in the importance of informal connections vis-à-vis competitiveness and capabilities in the process of institutional transition toward a market-oriented economy. Since the end of the 1970s, characterized by a seller's economy, China's market was filled with opportunities for entrepreneurs due to a lack of demand for consumption and productive goods across the board. However, those people who could identify the existence of entrepreneurial opportunities were not all able to realize practical entrepreneurial activities due to a lack of access to market resources, such as labor, capital, some factor inputs, land, and other market information. When private enterprises had not been granted legal status and were excluded from the state's universal distribution system, they always relied on government agencies or state-owned enterprises to access input or output markets (Zhang et al., 2006) . Thus, those individual entrepreneurs who could acquire access to market factors and establish business relations were more able to succeed. Constrained by the poor property rights and institutional uncertainty, the first generation of Chinese entrepreneurs had to make use of their personal networks (guanxi) among family members, relatives, and friends to form alliances with local government officials (Yang, 2007) . Tsang (1998) argues the guanxi-based social capital became a necessary and popular way for private businesses to obtain favors from resourceful agents. Carlisle and Flynn (2005) point out that guanxi served as a means for accumulating social capital that private enterprises needed to achieve sufficient legitimacy in the imperfect market. Entrepreneurs also tried to establish political connections with the CCP to acquire desirable resources and legitimacy. After Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, an increasing number of party members in government agencies and managers of SOEs quit their stable jobs and started their own businesses. Apart from the more relaxed environment for private businesses, one important factor related to this part of thriving entrepreneurship is the work experience gained by these entrepreneurs in the government and SOEs allowed them to form advantageous networks with key party members and government officials .
Since the 1978 reform, there have been numerous changes in the policies, regulations, and laws as well as in the Party's attitude toward private businesses in China. Present-day China differs dramatically with regard to both "formal and informal rules" related to entrepreneurship (Kshetri, 2007: p. 416 ). In the meantime, the private sector is playing an increasingly important role in promoting economic growth since the adoption of the opening-up policy. An entrepreneurship-friendly environment is emerging in China due to the adoption of a number of favorable policies. Yang and Li (2008) define the current stage of market transition as the "early stage of market transition"(p. 351), which is the stage before the completion of market transition. The significance attached to personal network-related social capital is not at the same level as that in the beginning of the reform. Facing intensified competition from transformed SOEs, foreign investment enterprises, and multinationals, private enterprises have to shift their attention from establishing personal networks to corporate entrepreneurship based on innovation. Scholars have noted that corporate entrepreneurial activities are necessary conditions for Chinese domestic firms to successfully compete in international markets (Yiu, Lau, and Bruton, 2007) . However, the current situation in China is that domestic entrepreneurs are working on strengthening their capabilities in innovation, while their competitiveness is still based on low prices and large volumes (Yang and Li, 2007) . Thus, the transition from network-based entrepreneurship toward innovation-based entrepreneurship is an important task for domestic entrepreneurs and for Chinese public policy makers.
Conclusion
This chapter provides a historical review of the development of domestic entrepreneurship in China since 1949, especially during the reform period. The socialist political system has been perceived as the most influential determinant of entrepreneurship development (Yu and Stough, 2006) . Thus, from the perspective of institutional transition, entrepreneurship development has been divided into three stages : 1978-1992, 1992-2000, and 2000-present. Chinese modern entrepreneurship originated from TVEs in rural areas. The speedy growth of township enterprises disseminated entrepreneurial activities to urban areas. These ambiguous policies toward private businesses in this period, on one hand, provide institutional opportunities for the emergence of entrepreneurship. On the other hand, the vulnerability of private businesses to local government due to its unequal status to state-owned sector shaped an institutional obstacle for entrepreneurship. The stages after 1992 witnessed a more matured institutional environment, since the legitimacy of private businesses was granted and the constitution was amended to protect private property rights. The social status of entrepreneurs has also been admitted and respected. Although the government is trying to create favorable market conditions for private firms by providing equal regulations and rules, there is still a long waiting time for the arrival of perfect market conditions. Thus, compared to the entrepreneurship development in western economies, entrepreneurship development in China is still in its infancy due to the imperfect institutional environment.
The historical review reveals some Chinese-specific characteristics in entrepreneurship. First, China's highly institutional uncertainty has created entrepreneurs with a "red hat". Private firms took the fuzzy property rights arrangement to evade discrimination in obtaining market attributes. Another Chinese characteristic is the significant regional variation in entrepreneurship development. Regional disparity in entrepreneurship is due to a variety of local socio-economic factors and local implementation of central policies. Last but not the least, China is now in the transition from network-based entrepreneurship toward innovation-based entrepreneurship. The extensive efforts made by Chinese entrepreneurs in establishing personal relationships need to be shifted to technology improvement in order to win in the face of higher levels of competition in the international market. The Chinese government should be very cautious in its provision of a favorable policy environment to encourage entrepreneurship development since its ambivalent attitude toward entrepreneurship due to the ideological controversy cannot be resolved in a short time. At the same time, the government should deepen its reform policy to provide a healthy venture capital market and technology transfer mechanism to encourage entrepreneurship based on independent innovation.
